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The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has embarked on an
ambitious program to return humans to the moon and beyond. As NASA moves forward in
the development and design of new launch vehicles for future space exploration, it must fully
consider the implications that rule-based requirements of redundancy or fault tolerance
have on system reliability/risk. These considerations include common cause failure,
increased system complexity, combined serial and parallel configurations, and the impact of
design features implemented to control premature activation. These factors and others must
be considered in trade studies to support design decisions that balance safety, reliability,
performance and system complexity to achieve a relatively simple, operable system that
provides the safest and most reliable system within the specified performance requirements.
This paper describes conditions under which additional functional redundancy can impede
improved system reliability. Examples from current ASA programs including the Ares I
Upper Stage will be shown.
I. Introduction
THE Ares I Launch Vehicle is the flfst in a series of two launch vehicles intended to support continued work onthe International Space Station (ISS), as well as to further the United States space exploration initiatives of
returning to the surface of the moon with an eventual human mission to Mars. In all mission scenarios,. the Ares I
vehicle is tasked to launch the crew capsule to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) where it may then proceed to the ISS or loiter
for rendezvous with additional space systems to be launched on the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (Fig. I).
This system configuration was initially identified in the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) as a
heritage based system most likely to satisfy mission and safety/risk requirements within the tight budget and
schedule constraints. The ESAS provided an initial conceptual architecture with identified constraints and heritage
systems that impose significant limitations on performance capability. For this reason, performance (as measured by
total mass) is a critical characteristic of the detailed design.
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Figure 1. ESAS Lunar Sortie Crew with Cargo DRM.
The Ares I configuration (Fig. 2) includes the First Stage (heritage hardware based on the current Reusable Solid
Rocket Motor used on Shuttle), the J2X Engine (based on previous J2S engine used on Saturn) and a new, clean-
sheet design for the Upper Stage. Given the inherent difficulty of applying redundancy or reducing mass on the
heritage systems, the Upper Stage has been targeted as the system element with the most design flexibility to address
system level performance issues. This
factor increases the importance of
applying redundancy in a judicious
manner where limitations imposed by
common cause failure, increased system
AscentStlll8 complexity, and combined serial and
1'- Expended parallel. configurations are fully
considered in the trade studies. This
approach is contrary to the traditional
approach within NASA to implement
redundancy or fault tolerance to hazards
which may result from either inadvertent
operation or failure to operate.
As this initiative moves forward, the
Agency must consider new ways to
control risk if performance requirements
are to be satisfied within the cost and
schedule constraints imposed on the
project. NASA has long implemented a
rule-based approach to reliability and
safety in which redundancy or fault
tolerance is specified based on the criticality associated with loss of function or inadvertent function. While this
rule-based methodology has been successfully implemented across a great many programs, it results in significant
increases in system complexity and cost, while reducing system
performance due to added mass and requirements for additional
resources (electrical power, thermal control). I f no significant
challenges exist in resources or performance, these demands are less
significant. However, in the design and development of a launch
vehicle, it is likely that significant issues exist in performance. In
addition to impacts to system cost, complexity, performance and
resource limitations, previous systems have not fully considered the
limitations on improvements in reliability and risk associated with
implementation of redundancy. This impact is particularly significant
in systems which remain dormant for some portion of the mission
profile where inadvertent operation is as much of a concern as failure
to operate when required.
This paper addresses the issues associated with redundancy
application as a rule based approach to identify the limitations that
mitigate against strict adherence to this philosophy, defines an Figure 2. Ares I Launch Vehicle.
approach to consider the impacts of must work and must not work
redundancy configurations, and applies the approach to an actual case to support a configuration trade study.
II. Impacts of Redundancy on System Reliability
A. Impact of Parallel-Series Configuration
In general, the impact of parallel and series redundancy on the reliability of a system can be characterized as
follows:
1) Parallel redundancy (redundancy implemented to "assure" operation) increases system reliability.
2) Series redundancy (redundancy implemented to "prevent" unwanted/premature operation) decreases system
reliability.
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Figure 3. Component Reliability vs. Series/Parallel/Parallel-Series Configurations.
As can be seen in Fig. 3 , for any component reliability, a series configuration reduces the reliability while a
parallel configuration increases reliability. If required to protect against both loss of function and premature
function (parallel-series configuration), the reliability is improved over a single component but the overall system
reliability is reduced from a simple parallel configuration.
Figure 4. Common Cause Failure Diagram
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B. Impact of Common Cause Failures (CCFs)
Common Cause Failures (CCFs) refer to a class of dependent failures that tend to reduce the effectiveness of
parallel redundancy as a means of improving system reliability. Using identical components in a parallel
configuration introduces coupling factors that can lead to the failure of multiple components due to a shared cause.
Coupling Factors are in essence shared susceptibilities to system challenges. The same susceptibilities that result in
the failure of a single component can cause the failure of several identical components in a parallel configuration
whenever these components are simultaneously challenged. Coupling factors are numerous for identical
components. Examples of coupling factors include the same manufacturer, same inspection process, same
maintenance procedures, same operating environment, and same design (Fig. 4). When performing root cause
analysis of Common Cause Failures it
becomes readily apparent that coupling
factors have a significant role.
The process of mitigating common
cause failures incorporates many of the
same strategies for improving component
reliability, such as de-rating of EEE parts,
poka yoke (mistake proofing), robust
design, HALTIHASS to identify and
eliminate failure modes, and inspection.
These methods not only improve reliability
significantly, but also reduce the need for a
greater amount redundancy. Whenever
redundancy is employed to improve
reliability and fault tolerance, it's important
to systematically identify coupling factors
and take steps to mitigate or eliminate them. One of the ways this can be done is by employing functional
redundancy using dissimilar redundant components. However, this approach introduces other issues because
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dissimilar functional redundancy increases cost and complexity and introduces additional failure modes. Taking
steps to mitigate the effects of the same environment should also be explored. For example, routing redundant
cabling on opposite sides of the vehicle to prevent common exposure to location hazards. Strategies can be used
during manufacturing, inspection, and maintenance to use different personnel on critical inspections and
maintenance procedures.
Several rules should be applied to ensure adequate design needs are met.
Rule 1 - Reduction of the probability of common stress (separation/shock mounting)
Rule 2 - Design redundant units to respond differently to a common stress (diversity)
Rule 3 - Make the design more rugged (high strength/de-rating/robust design)
These methods will reduce the risk of failures due to Common Cause significantly enough to improve the
reliability to an acceptable level for man rated vehicles. If it were possible from the safety, reliability, and economic
perspective to build completely independent redundant strings of avionics instrumentation, CCF analysis would not
be required.
C. Notional Example
To illustrate the impacts of the fault tolerance rule-based approach to reliability of a system, we take the
following example:
Suppose we have a simple fluid control valve whose function is to control the flow of fluid through the valve by
opening and closing an orifice. Now, suppose that the reliability of this particular valve is R=0.95. If a failure of
the valve to open causes fluid not flow through the valve when commanded and this, in turn, would cause a
catastrophic loss, the fault-tolerance rule based approach would be applied and a second, redundant valve would be
RII=1-(0 .05)2=0.9975
Figure 5. Increasing Failure Tolerance to a Valve Control Failure to Open.
added to the system. Adding this additional valve increases the reliability of the system to 0.9975,
exclusive of CCFs (Fig. 5). In addition, if a failure to close or an inadvertent opening of the valve also causes a
catastrophic loss, then again the fault-tolerance rules apply and additional redundancy is added (Fig. 6). This
decreases the reliability in the parallel only configuration as also increases the mass fourfold from the initial
configuration while increasing complexity, requiring more inspection, maintenance, etc.
Figure 6. Parallel/Series Valve Control Configuration.
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If we include common cause failures, we see that the reliability is even more degraded. Using the Beta Factor
modeling approach to modeling common cause basic events, we get the results listed in Table I. The beta factor of
3.09% comes from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's CCF database (2003 update) of generic priors.
F 'I resCCfR r bT W' h d W' hompanson 0 e la I ltv It an It out ommon ause al u
Rei w/o CCF Rei wCCF
Sinqle Valve 0.9500 0.9500
Parallel Confiquration 0.9975 0.9961
Parallel/Series Confiquration 0.9905 0.9895
Table 1 C
III. Historical and Current Examples
A. International Space Station Centralized Fire Suppression System
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The issue of applying rule-based approaches to system design to address reliability and safety concerns has not
historically been addressed in upfront trade studies. There are historical examples of the impact associated with
failure to consider the limitations on benefits of additional redundancy, as well as the impact to system complexity
and mass driven by rigid application of these rules.
Among the more well known cases is the centralized fire
suppression system initially identified for the Space Station
Freedom (later known as the International Space Station).
As a safety system, the rule-based approach required single
failure tolerance to provide C02 to each of the powered
racks on space station. Application of the rule resulted in a
relatively simple design implementation as shown in Fig. 7.
The configuration in Fig. 7 assured that C02 was
(lvailable as a fire suppressant in the event one of the rack
supply valves failed closed, meeting the rule-based
requirement for single failure tolerance with minimum
additional mass and complexity. The problem is that this is
only part of the required rule application. Since the C02 represents a potential asphyxiation hazard to the crew if
inadvertently discharged, the rule also required single failure tolerance to that event.
The configuration in Fig. 8 applied the rule-based redundancy requirements for both failure to activate and
inadvertent activation, resulting in significant increases in
system mass, complexity and cost. The system reliability
associated with the parallel configuration decreased when
additional series valves were added. Each powered rack was
required to include four valves to provide fLJe suppression
capability to the rack while protecting against the
asphyxiation hazard. This design solution was ultimately
rejected due to cost and complexity and replaced with an
approach using a portable fire extinguisher connected to a
valve/port in the rack face, a very simple method to provide
the required protection without significant cost and
performance impacts. A great deal of time and effort was
expended developing a design implementation that was Figure 8. ISS centralized fire suppression system -
prohibitively expensive from a cost, mass, and complexity rule based approach.
perspective. It is also unclear that the ultimate solution, with
its man-in-the-Ioop requirement, was an optimal solution. For this reason, it is appropriate to consider approaches
during the upfront concept development phase which may not rigidly comply with rule-based approaches, yet
provide a reasonable and balanced consideration of all safety, reliability, and performance impacts of the
configuration.
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Figure 7. ISS centralized fire suppression system.
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B. Ares [ Upper Stage Main Propulsion System Solenoid Control Valves
I. Introduction
The need for study of the example described in this subsection first became apparent due to a proposed design
change affecting the total number of solenoid control valves to be used as well as the design configuration of
solenoid control valve package (Fig. 9) that controls the MPS LH2 (fuel) and L02 (oxidizer) propellant feed
prevalves.
A proposal was made to reduce the total number of solenoid control valves that control both the LH2 and
L02 prevalves in order to reduce the overall cost and weight, while increasing the overall system reliability. This
proposed change involved reducing the eight 2-way solenoid control valves used to control the LH2 and L02
prevalves down to a single 3-way solenoid control valve (Fig. 10).
Before approving the change, a formal reliability trade study was requested to quantify the impact on
reliability compared to the baseline design in Fig. 9. During the course of this study, additional valve design
configurations that are more fault tolerant were examined. These alternative design configurations were investigated
in order to maintain a one fault tolerant design with respect to catastrophic hazards.
ie~ & 102 Prevalves
SolenOId Control
Valve Package (8. 2-
Way Valves)
IVal.. Set I I
IVal.. Set2!
2. System Description
For the baseline design, there are
two "valve set" packages that
control the opening and closing of
the LH2 and L02 propellant supply
prevalves and one "valve set" that
controls the opening and closing of
the LH2 and L02 recirculation
valves. These are illustrated in Fig.
9 below. Likewise, the alternative
designs are shown in Figs 10, II,
and 12 respectively.
In the baseline design there are
:gure 9. LH2 & L02 Prevalves Solenoid Control Valve Package (8, 2- eight 2-way solenoid control valves
ay Valves) in a parallel-series arrangement that
control the opening and closing of two 2-way prevalves, one each for the LH2 (fuel) and L02 (oxidizer) upper stage
propellant feed supply systems. In addition, there are two ascent time intervals of primary interest here. The first
time interval (130 seconds) is the time interval covering first stage boost and the second time interval (430 seconds)
is the time interval covering upper stage bum. While on the ground, or during first stage boost, the LH2 and L02
prevalves are required to be in the "closed" position. Prior to initiation of upper stage ignition and bum, these
prevalves are required to open in order to supply the upper stage engine (USE) with LH2 (fuel) and L02 (oxidizer).
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Figure II. Proposed Valve Configuration - Alternative 3.
Figure 12. Proposed Valve Configuration - Alternative 4
Figure 10. Proposed Valve Configuration - Alternative 2.
Valve set I and valve set 2 that control the
operation of the LH2 and L02 prevalves are
"energized" at different times in the ascent
mission profile. When de-energized, all of these
valves are in the spring loaded closed position.
That is, all valves in valve sets I & 2 consist of
normally spring closed, energized open 2-way
valves. While on the ground and during first stage
boost (t = 0 sec to t = 130 sec), valve set I is in
the "de-energized" or "closed" position, or the
spring-loaded closed position, as valve set I is
responsible for providing the vent during upper
stage bum. During this same time period, valve
set 2 is in the "energized" or "open" position
which corresponds to the LH2 and L02 prevalves
being closed due to pneumatic helium pressure
supplied to the prevalves by valve set 2.
Likewise, during upper stage bum, valve set 2
is de-energized which allows these valves to go to
their spring loaded closed position thereby cutting
off pneumatic helium actuation pressure to the
LH2 and L02 prevalves. During this same time
period, the valves in valve set I are energized
thereby opening these valves and allowing the
pneumatic helium pressure that had been keeping
the LH2 and L02 prevalves closed to vent.
Providing this vent allows the LH2 and L02
prevalves to open since, without pneumatic
helium pressure applied, the prevalves are
normally spring loaded open valves. This allows
LH2 and L02 propellant to enter their respective
feed lines to supply the 12X with fuel and oxidizer
during upper stage engine ignition and bum.
3. Results
Design alternative 4 (Fig. 12) was shown to
provide the greatest increase in overall system
reliability. This is followed by design alternative
2 (Fig. 10), then the baseline design (Fig. 9), and
lastly design alternative 3. It should be noted that
while design alternative 2 (Fig. 10) has a lower
overall failure probability as compared to the
original, baseline design (Fig. 9), design
alternative 2 is clearly not better than the baseline
design or alternatives 3 and 4 from the standpoint
of fault tolerance. Alternative 2 does not
maintain the requirement for a one fault tolerant
system whereas the baseline design does, even
though its overall system failure probability is
higher. The same results apply when comparing design alternatives 2 & 3 where alternative 3 is more fault tolerant
than alternative 2. Similarly, alternative 4 provides a higher level of fault tolerance when compared to both
alternatives 2 or 3, but does not provide for complete fault tolerance as does the original baseline design.
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C. Ares I Vpper Stage Avionics
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I. Introduction
In September of 2006, a trade study was performed with partiCipation from the author(s) to determine a
reliability goal for the Ares I Avionics. To establish the level of reliability for the Ares I avionics subsystem, a
notional allocation was performed based on an assumed vehicle Loss Of Mission (LOM) risk requirement of no
greater than 1 in 500. As a goal, the avionics allocation was assumed to be a negligible contributor to the overall
risk.
Figure 13 shows the avionics contribution to overall
Ares I LOM risk as a function· of avionics reliability. If
less than I percent contribution to overall risk is deemed
negligible, then an avionics reliability greater than
0.99998 would be required. An avionics reliability of
0.99999 would represent 0.5 percent of the overall
system risk. Note that the risk in Fig. 13 is plotted on a
logarithmic scale to amplify the relationship to avionics
reliability. There exists a point at which increasing
levels of avionics does virtually nothing to decrease
mission risk. A better way of demonstrating this
principle is shown in Fig. 14. By fixing the rest of the
vehicle (CLV minus avionics) at a reliability of 0.998, or
a LOM risk of I in 500 and adding in the avionics at
increasing levels of reliability, the effect on overall Avionics Reliabilty
system risk can be observed. Fig. 14 shows an "s" curve
Figure 13 Avionics contribution to overallwhere initially the avionics reliability has a significant ...'. ..
impact on overall system risk. Beyond 0.99995, the miSSIOn nsk of 1 In SOo-loganthmlc scale.
impact becomes negligible as the overall system risk asymptotically approaches the l-in-500 allocation. Thus, an
avionics reliability of 0.99995 was selected as a goal in determining the appropriate level of fault tolerance.
Before the Ares I Upper Stage Preliminary Design Review, a Fault Tolerance study was performed on actual
Ares I Avionics system candidate configurations. This trade study was performed using a detailed model of the
avionics system configurations which included mission
times, appropriate logic gates, and common cause failure
calculations. The basis of this study was to assess
candidate fault tolerant avionics architectures. Among the
primary objectives was to compare the fault tolerant
architectures in terms of reliability, and risk to compare
against cost and weight. A bottom-up analysis was
performed to parametrically examine reliability as a
function of fault tolerance and redundancy schemes.
Results of the analysis showed that going to higher levels
of fault tolerance yields a negligible increase in reliability
regardless of the redundancy scheme. For the Ares I
avionics architecture, the impact of increasing levels of
fault tolerance (beyond I-fault tolerant) is limited by the
probability of common-cause failure.
2. System Desription
The various system designs included two fault tolerant
and one fault tolerant designs as depicted in Figs. 15 and 16. The trade study model also included the first stage
avionics, upper stage avionics, electrical power, and engine control unit electronics as part of the study. The CCF
model was based upon Space Shuttle Beta factors for both demand and time based failures. A conservative
approach was taken by utilizing International Space Station mission time lines, and adjusting electronics component
failure rates to the appropriate flight environment based upon guidelines found in MIL-HDBK-338B.
Avionics Rellabitity
Figure 14. eLV LOM risk as a function of avionics
reliability.
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Figure 16. 1FT Avionics Design
The ARES I Avionics System was originally designed
as a four string two fault tolerant system (Fig. 15). In
general this design included quadruple components across
the design. Each independent string of avionics
transmitted commands and received data from each strings
components. Data was processed across the system in a
parallel voting scheme with cross strapped flight
computers that provide data sharing among all flight
computers. This system would have to experience three
independent failures of flight critical components to reach
a potential abort condition. The system was comprised of
Command and Data Handling, Guidance Navigation and
Control, Electrical Power, Flight Safety, and Operational
Figure 15. 2FT Baseline Design Instrumentation sub-systems which encompass the primary
flight critical components. Data communications to upper and first stage components was provided via a 15538
flight critical data bus with crew exploration vehicle communications was via a I394B data bus. Operational and
Engineering data will be collected and transmitted to
ground .operations via the two Command and
Telemetry Computers and the Radio Frequency
Communications sub-systems.
The current ARES I Avionics System is a
modified three string parallel voting system with cross
strapped flight computers that provide data sharing
among all flight computers (Fig. 16). The system is
comprised of Command and Data Handling, Guidance
Navigation and Control, Electrical Power, Flight
Safety, and Operational Instrumentation sub-systems
which encompass the primary flight critical
components. Data communications to upper and first
stage components is provided via a 1553B flight
critical data bus. Data communications to the crew vehicle is via a Giga-Bit Ethernet data bus. Other sub-systems
such as Radio Frequency Communications and Motion Imagery encompass the non- flight critical components. Each
Flight computer will contain duplicate copies of the flight software. Operational and Engineering data will be
collected and transmitted to ground operations via the two Command and Telemetry Computers and the Radio
Frequency Communications sub-systems.
3. Results
Trade study results showed that the one Fault Tolerant design was sufficient to meet NASA's LOM
requirements, as discussed in the introduction, for Avionics systems as seen in Table 2. These results further
validate the previous Avionics Fault Tolerant trade study results that indicated reliability beyond three strings of
avionics is minimized by the prevalence of CCFs.
Figure 17 shows the impact of CCFs to the avionics LOM risk. At 10 percent, the LOM risk is around 1 in
7,200. As the Common Cause Failure Fraction (CCCF) for a single-fault tolerant system is reduced, a significant
reduction in risk can be realized. For the Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) values of 2.5 percent for
electronics, the risk would be approximately I in 15,000. However, this value has been attained only after several
decades of development and reliability growth. To reach the originally targeted reliability of 0.99995 (or I in
20,000) the CCFF would have to be reduced to around I percent, which may not be possible.
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As a result of the trade study results in conjunction with the September 2006 study, the decision to change the
avionics system to a one fault tolerant design was approved by the Constellation Program Safety, Reliability, and
Quality Assurance Board.
Common Cause Failure Fraction
Figure 17. Avionics LOM risk versus CCFF.
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Ares I Upper Stage.
IV. Conclusion
We can conclude from this paper that reliability can be degraded by relying on the traditional rule-based fault
tolerance approach. By showing several empirical examples, flexibility to these rules must be taken into account in
order to balance safety, reliability, weight, cost, and perfomlance. NASA has now taken a more flexible design
approach to ensure that all factors are considered, which will allow us to ultimately arrive at the best possible launch
vehicle architecture that will take us forward in NASA's future endeavors to the moon and beyond.
References
A. Mosleh, D.M. Rasmuson, and F.M. Marshall, NUREG CR-5485, "Guidelines on Modeling Common-Cause Failures in
Probabilistic Risk Assessment", Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and University of Maryland,
Prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1998
G. Kaltz, Upper Stage Probabilistic Risk Assessment Memorandum, "Ares I Upper Stage Main Propulsion System (MPS) -
LH2/L02 Prevalve & LH2/L02 Recirculation Valve Solenoid Control Valve Reliability Trade Study", Marshall Space Flight
Center, Huntsville, AL., February 2008.
G. S. Hatfield, et. al. "Crew Launch Vehicle Avionics Architecture Fault Tolerance Assessment", Marshall Space Flight
Center, Huntsville, AL., September 2006.
ASA-TM-2005-214062 "NASA's Exploration Systems Architecture Study", November 2005
10
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
